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The Normativity of Kant's Logical Laws
Jessica Leech
Abstract
According to received wisdom, Kant takes the laws of logic to be normative
laws of thought. This has been challenged by Tolley (2006). In this paper,
I defend the received wisdom, but with an important modiﬁcation: Kant's
logical laws are constitutive norms for thought. The laws of logic do tell us
what thinking is, not because all thoughts are in conformity with logical laws,
but because all thoughts are, by nature, subject to the standard of logic.
1 Constitutive and normative laws
There are diﬀerent ways a law might govern some state or phenomenon. Laws can
be normative, constitutive, or constitutive norms. Laws for F s are normative if they
determine what is a good F or a bad F . For example, the laws of a nation determine
what actions are legally permissible, legally obligatory, and legally impermissible.
But they do not thereby determine what counts as an action: even illegal actions
are actions. Laws for Fs are constitutive if they determine what is an F and what
isn't an F . For example, the rules for sonnet form determine what counts as a
sonnet. If a poem closely follows the right rhyme scheme, but is only 12 lines long,
then it isn't a bad sonnetit isn't a sonnet at all. Laws for F s are constitutive
norms if evaluability in light of the laws determines what is an F and what isn't an
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F . For example, if I am on a large ﬁeld with goals at opposite ends, surrounded by
other players, I only count as playing football (soccer) if certain actions are evaluable
as wrong or right according to the laws of football. For example, if passing the ball
using my hand counts as wrong, but kicking it forward counts as permissible, I am
playing football. If those actions have no normative status at all, or a diﬀerent
status, then I'm not playing football. I am playing football as long as my actions
are held to the standards (norms) of football. If I punch the ball towards goal
using my hand, I can still count as playing football, so the laws are not purely
constitutive. In this case, I am playing football as long as punching the ball (when
not the goalkeeper) counts as an illegal move.1
One question we can ask about the laws of logic, then, is whether they are
constitutive, normative, or constitutive norms. Some philosophers have taken the
laws of logic to be laws of thought, particularly Kant and Frege.2 If the laws of logic
are constitutive laws of thought, then we cannot have thoughts that violate the laws
of logic: we cannot have illogical thoughts. If they are normative for thought, then
illogical thoughts are bad, but they are still thoughts. If they are constitutive norms,
then we count as thinking as long as our thoughts are evaluable as right or wrong
in light of those norms: I can have illogical thoughts, as long as they are counted
as bad, in light of the laws of logic.
Kant has traditionally been understood as claiming that the laws of logic are
normative.3
In logic, however, the question is not about contingent but about ne-
cessary rules; not how we do think, but how we ought to think. ...
In logic we do not want to know how the understanding is and does
think and how it has previously proceeded in thought, but rather how
it ought to proceed in thought. Logic is to teach us the correct use of
the understanding. (9:14: Kant, 1992, 529)
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However, this interpretation has been challenged by Tolley (2006), who argues that
Kant takes the laws of logic to be constitutive. The aim of this paper is, in part, to
show that Tolley's interpretation is wrong. I will argue that Kant is committed to
the laws of logic being normative, at least in some sense. I will argue that, on the
assumption of a plausible and undemanding conception of `thought', we can make
best sense of Kant's view of the laws of logic if we take them to be constitutive
norms for thought. Tolley is correct to cast doubt on a purely normative reading, but
he goes too far in claiming that the laws of logic are straightforwardly constitutive.
I am not alone in my reading of Kant. For example, MacFarlane (2002) writes,
The laws of logic, by contrast, are deﬁned as the . . . necessary laws of
the understanding and of reason in general, or what is one and the same,
of the mere form of thought as such . . .  (JL:13). By necessary laws
of the understanding, Kant means . . . those [laws] without which no
use of the understanding would be possible at all . . .  (JL:12), that is,
the norms constitutive of thought. (MacFarlane, 2002, 53, emphasis
added)
In discussing the formality of logic, Dutilh Novaes writes
For our purposes, the most salient uses of the term `formal' as pertaining
to constitutive rules or norms concern the Kantian thesis of the existence
of laws of thought as constitutive of the understanding as such. This ...
has (at least) two distinctive components, which must not be conﬂated:
the idea that the laws of thought are completely dissociated from the
physical world ... and the idea that the laws of thought have a normative
import. (Dutilh Novaes, 2011, 328)
Nevertheless, this view needs further defence.
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2 Preliminaries
Before proceeding, I want to clarify the terms of the present discussion. First, some
matters of Kant interpretation; second, some clariﬁcation of the kinds of norms and
the notion of `thinkability' involved.
The key passage from Kant oﬀered above, and a fair portion of the textual
evidence discussed below, come from Kant's lectures on logic. These are a con-
tentious source, because they are based on student notes rather than prepared by
Kant himself for publication. It seems reasonable, ceteris paribus, to place more
weight on Kant's published works, rather than these lectures. In this instance, that
means the Critiques and his published essays. There is, however, a complication.
In the relevant published texts, Kant isn't so much concerned with what he would
call `pure general logic' (what we would usually call `logic'). In particular, although
he does discuss pure general logic in the Critique of Pure Reason, there Kant is
more concerned to give an account of transcendental logic, which takes account of
the conditions of intentionality. It is only in his lectures on logic that his attention
is centred on logic. Hence, we might allow ourselves to give these lectures a little
more weight in the present context. Moreover, were Kant particularly unclear or
equivocal in these lectures, we might worry about layering interpretation on top of
an already suspect source. However, we get some very clear statements about the
nature of logical laws (as above). With these considerations in mind, then, I will
continue tentatively to draw on the logic lectures, but I will also take care to draw
on Kant's directly written published works, and highlight where these issues arise.
The above has consequences for the overall interpretive aim of this paper. Kant
does not, to my knowledge, explicitly make a threeway distinction, as I have, between
constitutive laws, normative laws, and constitutive norms. Moreover, as noted, his
primary concern was not with the nature of (pure general) logic, and the most
reliable sources are focused on other (albeit related) matters. As such, it would be
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over-ambitious to claim that Kant explicitly had in his head at the time of writing
the precise view which I oﬀer below. Rather, I oﬀer the view that the laws of logic
are constitituve norms for thought as the best way to do justice to the various
claims made by Kant. This view strikes what I take to be the best balance between
the clear and unequivocal statements that logic is normative for thought, and those
passages which appear to support a constitutive reading. I think one can conjecture
that Kant would ﬁnd this interpretation a reasonable way to capture the range of
claims he makes about logical laws, even if he didn't put things in precisely these
terms.
Let me now clarify the kind of normativity implicated in these constitutive norms.
There are diﬀerent ways we might think of a norm. Sellars (1969) classically dis-
tinguished between `oughts-to-do' (rules of action) and `oughts-to-be' (rules of
criticism).4 A rule of action says something like: if one is in circumstance C, one
ought to do action A. In these cases, Sellars argues, in order to conform to the norm
an agent needs to have concepts of C and A.
The important feature, for our purposes, of general categorical oug-
hts of the above form is that for actual existence to conform to these
oughts is a matter of the agents to which they apply doing A when they
are actually in the speciﬁed circumstance C; and this, in turn, a matter
of their setting about doing A when they believe that the circumstances
are C.
It follows that the `subjects' to which these rules apply must have the
concepts of doing A and being in C. They must have, to use a current
turn of phrase, the appropriate `recognitional capacities.' Sellars (1969,
5078)
A rule of criticism is of the form
Xs ought to be in state ϕ, whenever such and such is the case. Sellars
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(1969, 508)
In this case, there is no longer the conceptual requirement.
This time, however, the conformity of actual existence to the ought does
not, in general, require that the Xs which are, in a sense, the subjects
of the rule, i.e. that to which it applies, have the concept of what it
is to be in state ϕ or of what it is for such and such to be the case.
Sellars (1969, 508)
This distinction is important when we come to ask what kind of normseven in the
case of constitutive normscould be active in the case of logical laws. Taking the
laws of logic to be oughts-to-do that are constitutive of thinking would be deeply
implausible. For that would mean that it is constitutive of thinking that we are
subject to these logical norms and, moreover, that we know what the laws of logic
are and what cognitive circumstances call for the application of which law. That
would mean that only (successful) students of logic and logicians could count as
thinkers, which would be rather unfair on everyone else.
Much better, then, to understand the norms as rules of criticism, standards
against which our mental activity must be evaluable in order for that activity to
count as thinking, where we don't need to be explicitly aware of those laws. One
might think that, nevertheless, thinkers need at least some implicit awareness of the
laws, such that, for example, they would be prepared to correct themselves when
shown a logical error. Hence, the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes.
Thinkers should not be required to have full logical recognitional capacities in order
to count as thinkers, that is, they shouldn't need to be accomplished logicians. But
they should be sensitive to logical correction and tuition.
Dutilh Novaes captures this thought in terms of acknowledging the authority of
logical norms.
So (according to the Kantian view) the formal (i.e. constitutive) laws
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of thought are binding in the sense that any thinker must be responsible
towards them, and must thus acknowledge their authority over him/her.
Should he/she refuse to do so, then indeed his/her `thoughts' can no
longer be viewed as thoughts properly speaking, as they are no more
than erratic ruminations. (Dutilh Novaes, 2011, 3289)
Taschek (2008) makes a similar point.
To acknowledge the categorical authority of logic will involve one's pos-
sessing a capacity to recognizewhen being sincere and reﬂective, and
possibly with appropriate promptinglogical mistakes both in one's own
judgemental and inferential practice and that of others. Moreover, upon
recognizing such a mistake in one's own case, one will feel an uncondi-
tional obligation to correct it. (Taschek, 2008, 384)
If the laws of logic are norms that are genuinely constitutive of thought, it is not
surprising that, given enough prompting, we should be sensitive to them. But it
doesn't follow from this that we should be able to start out as thinkers with a clear
and explicit grasp of these laws.
Finally, a word on what I mean by 'thought' and 'thinking'. To say what I have
said before: `I have in mind a conception which includes something as minimal as
`entertaining a proposition', as well as more robust thoughts such as `opining that
p', beliefs, propositional knowledge, drawing inferences, and so on. The core idea is
that some propositional content should be involved. So, for example, cases which
are not obviously propositional, for example, cases of mental imagery, or trying
to remember a melody, will count as cases of thinking in my sense only if they are
accompanied by some propositional content. This isn't a very demanding condition;
for example, in trying to imagine a scenario, I may often have a description in mind
to guide my imagining, which is propositional in form.' (Leech, 2015, 2)
If we are able to think something, then we have meaningful thought constitu-
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ents put together in a meaningful way. There will thus be some constitutive rules
for thoughts, namely, those that ensure their meaningfulness. Thoughts must be
`grammatical' or `well-formed', in the sense of being put together the right way,
for example, one couldn't think that Socrates philosopher, but rather, perhaps, that
Socrates was a philosopher. For Kant, meaningful thoughts need not also succeed in
referring to objects. He took thoughts about God, freedom, the soul, and noumena
to make sense (he wrote many pages on them), whilst lacking objective validity:
`even if we cannot cognize these same objects as things in themselves, we at least
must be able to think them...' (Bxxvi).5 So, for example, one can think that God
is good : such a thought is well-formed, it makes sense, although it lacks an object.
This is just one interpretation one might have of Kant's view of thought. It
is an interpretation which prima facie allows room for contradictory thought. An
alternative, more demanding, conception of thought might, for example, require
not only that a proposition be entertained, but that it be non-contradictory. One
might charge, then, that Tolley and I are simply attributing diﬀerent conceptions of
thought to Kant, rather than strictly disagreeing only over the status of purported
contradictory thoughts. I do not have space here to defend my own interpretation
of Kant on thought, but one can perhaps take this paper as a whole as contributing
to that interpretation. If I am right that Kant holds this relatively undemanding
view of thought, then the following is a plausible interpretation, I contend, of what
he has to say about the laws of logic and their relation to thought. If the reader
disagrees with my conclusions here, then the implication may be wider than merely
Kant's view on logical laws; this will have consequences for what the reader takes
Kant to understand by `thought' itself.
With all this in place, let us proceed.
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3 Can there be contradictory thought? Argu-
ments for.
Tolley claims that, for Kant, there are three conditions on the normativity of a law:
1. The subjects of the lawthose beings which are governed by, or subjected
to, the lawmust both be able to succeed and be able to fail to act (or be)
in accordance with the law.
2. The subjects of a norm must retain their identity as beings that are subjected
to this speciﬁc sort of law regardless of their (actual) accord with it. This
latter condition is important, as it implies that evaluative ascriptions in light
of norms (e.g., x as in or out of accord) institute a division within some
otherwise well-deﬁned class.
3. The laws must retain their validity or bindingness over their subjects regardless
of the (lack of) actual adherence to the norms by their subjectsthough,
to be sure, there must be the possibility of such adherence (to uphold the
traditional formula that ought implies can). (Tolley, 2006, 375)
Note already that these conditions can be fulﬁlled by a constitutive norm, as much
as a normative law. If being G is a constitutive norm for F s, then (1) F s can be
both G and non-G (as long as the former counts as good, the latter as bad); (2)
something can retain its identity as an F regardless of whether it is G or not, as
long as being G would be good for the F , and failing to be G would be bad; and
(3) regardless of whether F is actually G or not, the norm that F s should be G
would still be binding.
Tolley takes Kant's writings to commit him to the view that we cannot think
illogical thoughts. His worry is then that this is incompatible with logical laws being
merely normative, in the sense captured by these three conditions. (1) If we cannot
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think illogical thoughts, then we cannot fail to think in accordance with the laws of
logic. (2) One would not count as a thinker, if all one's mental states were contrary
to logical laws. (3) It would be unclear what relevance the laws of logic would have
for us, if we never had the kind of mental state, thoughts, that are in accord with
them.
This line of argument only works if Kant is, indeed, committed to the view that
there cannot be contradictory thought, that is, if one purported to be thinking a
contradiction, one would in fact be doing something else. I think Kant is not so com-
mitted. There are convincing reasons to understand Kant as taking contradictions
to be meaningful and false.
First, it seems clear to me that we can in fact think contradictions, and I have
argued this in detail elsewhere (see Leech, 2015). I suggested above that if we
have meaningful thought constituents (e.g., concepts, propositions) put together in
a meaningful structure, then we have a meaningful thought. So, for example, if it
is ﬁne to think that grass is green, and also ﬁne to think that grass is not green,
it seems strange to suppose that merely putting these together gives us something
that one cannot think, that is, that grass is green and grass is not green. One might
have trouble believing or committing to such a thought, but that is not what is at
issue.6 The question is whether such a content can be entertained in thought, not
whether it can be endorsed.
These considerations aside, what concerns us here is Kant's view. Is he com-
mitted to the thinkability, or to the unthinkability, of contradictions (or neither)? In
order for key parts of Kant's work to make sense, we must be able to understand
and think contradictions. Hence, I take him to be committed to the thinkability
of contradictions, that is, that we can think meaningful thoughts that are contra-
dictory. Otherwise it would be impossible for him to have expressed, and for us to
grasp, these philosophical points.
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Let us ﬁrst consider some of the `obscurities and contradictions' (Aviii) into
which Kant argues human reason inevitably falls: the Antinomies. In these sections
of the Critique, Kant argues that reason appears to be inevitably led into contra-
diction by its own workings. Each Antinomy consists of two arguments, thesis and
antithesis, each seemingly acceptable but leading to opposing conclusions. Kant
argues that, if we assume transcendental realismthat our knowledge is of things
in themselves (not appearances)then the conclusions of the Antinomies are con-
tradictory, for example, the world is both inﬁnite and ﬁnite. However, Kant argues
that these conclusions can be shown to be compatible under the assumption of
transcendental idealism (A5045/B5323), the assumption that our knowledge is
of appearances, which are (in some sense) distinct from things in themselves.7 For
example, if we give up the assumption that we can cognize the world as a determi-
nate whole, then it is false both that the world is determinately ﬁnite, and that it
is determinately inﬁnite. Rather, the world is of indeﬁnite extent.
We must take care here. Kant doesn't explicitly claim that, when reason falls
prey to antinomial reasoning, we thereby think contradictions. But I contend that
in order for us (and Kant) to understand the Antinomiesto make sense of his
arguments therewe need to be able to think contradictions. Recall: this is not to
say we need to be able to believe or endorse them, just to entertain contradictory
content in thought. It is in this sense that Kant is committed here to the thinkability
of contradictions. The thought is this: we could not understand Kant's arguments
in the Antinomies without being able to entertain a contradiction in thought; to
recognize the diﬀerence between contradictions and contraries;8 and to recognise
that the transcendental realist will be saddled with a commitment to contradictions.
We need to be able to recognise, in thought, so that we can follow the argument and
continue on to the right conclusions, that under the assumption of transcendental
realism, the thesis and antithesis combine to form a contradiction. For example,
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we might conclude that the world is ﬁnite in extent, and that the world is inﬁnite
in extent. Only once we've recognised that the world is determinate and ﬁnite and
the world is determinate and inﬁnite is a contradiction, will we be moved to ﬁnd a
way to reject some assumption to avoid this contradiction (namely, the assumption
that the world is determinate in its extent). We can only follow the steps of the
argument if we can think and understand such a thought, recognise that it is a
contradiction, and respond accordingly.
One might respond that we don't need to think the contradiction itself, we need
merely to recognise that reason is taking us down a risky path, towards an act in
which we would no longer be thinking.9 But how, roughly, would this work? We
notice that one respectable line of reasoning will lead us to conclude that p. We
notice that another, equally respectable line of reasoning will lead us to conclude
that not-p. What stops us continuing? Recognising that it would be, in some sense,
a bad thing to end up concluding both p and not-p. But if we get that far, we've just
entertained the thought that p and not-p, recognised that we don't want to endorse
that thought, and decided to change tack. To recognise impending contradiction
in some other way may be possible, but would require a much more complicated
story, one that I leave the onus to develop on my opponent.
Elsewhere in the Critique, Kant presents the principle of contradiction as `the
supreme principle of all analytic judgments' (A150/B189).
For, if the judgment is analytic, ... its truth must always be cognized
suﬃciently in accordance with the principle of contradiction. For the
contrary of that which as a concept already lies and is thought in the
cognition of the object is always correctly denied, while the concept itself
must necessarily be aﬃrmed of it, since its opposite would contradict
the object. (A151/B1901)
Note: Kant does not say that the contrary of a concept contained in the subject
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concept is always denied, but that it is always correctly denied, hinting towards
a normative reading. But that is not my main point. Kant takes the trouble to
argue that some cases of what we always thought were analytic judgments are in
fact synthetic, in particular, cases of arithmetical and geometrical judgments. If the
principle of analytic judgments is the principle of contradiction, and if contradictions
cannot be thought, then there would appear to be a fairly simple and obvious test
for whether a given judgment is analytic or synthetic: try to think its negation, and
if you fail to think anything, the judgment is analytic (if you succeed in thinking,
it's synthetic). If Kant argued in this way, that would count as evidence toward the
view that he takes contradictions to be unthinkable. But he does not. He invites us
to inspect the content of our subject concepts, for example, 7+5, and to discover
thatcontrary to expectationthe predicate concepts, for example, =12, are not
to be found there. He does not point out that we are able to think that it is not
the case that 7+5=12. (See B1418). Moreover, this is supposed to be a notable
discovery.
Mathematical judgments are all synthetic. This proposition seems to
have escaped the notice of the analysts of human reason until now,
indeed to be diametrically opposed to all of their conjectures. (B14)
If thought really ceases when we attempt to think the negation of an analytic judg-
ment, rather than that of a synthetic judgment, one would have thought someone
might have already noticed this. One might think that it would be more obvious
what the analytic judgments are. This, then, adds more weight to the view that
it is correct to read Kant as committed to the position that contradictions can be
thought (even though, in light of the laws of logic, they shouldn't be).
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant presents maxims of common human under-
standing.
(1) To think for oneself; (2) To think in the position of everyone else; (3)
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Always to think in accord with oneself. . . . The third maxim, namely
that of the consistent way of thinking, is the most diﬃcult to achieve,
and can only be achieved through the combination of the ﬁrst two and
after frequent observance of them has made them automatic. (5:2945
Kant, 2000, 1745)
`Consistent thinking', or `thinking in accord with oneself' is not presented here as
mere triviality, but rather as a signiﬁcant acheivement, only possible through hard
work. Inconsistent thought is not, therefore, an impossibility, but a common problem
which we must work hard to overcome.
Kant also makes explicit claims about contradictions. In his lectures on logic,
he claims that they are false.
A cognition that contradicts itself is of course false. (9:51: Kant, 1992,
559)
A cognition is false if it contradicts itself. (24:826 Kant, 1992, 283)
If contradictions are false, then there is a content that we can think and recognise
as false. So Kant cannot think that there is no thought at all here.
There are various responses to this. First, one might take a second-order thought
to be suﬃcient to account for such cases. Rather than being able to think p and
not-p, we can think it is a contradiction that p and not-p, and hence, via this
non-contradictory thought, recognise that p and not-p is false.10 But there are at
least two problems with this. One: to be able to understand the whole thought it
is a contradiction that p and not-p, we need to be able to understand the parts,
including p and not-p. In other words, if the whole thought is meaningful, then
surely the parts are meaningful too. Two: even in the second-order thought, we are
attributing properties of falsehood and contradictoriness to something. But what, if
not a thought or cognition? It seems strange to attribute a property such as falsity
to something that is not itself a meaningful thought.
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A second line of response would be to suggest that there are two kinds of falsity:
the kind that occurs when a meaningful thought gets things wrong; and the kind
that occurs when a purported thought cancels itself out.11 So, when Kant says
that a contradictory cognition is false, he is in fact saying that there is no such
cognition. Just as a false friend is no friend at all, so a false thoughtin some
casesis no thought at all.12 However, this proposal invites a number of questions.
Falsehood is attributed to something : what is it, if not a cognition or a thought?
One suggestion, which I will look at in more detail below, is that there is `nothing'.
But then why would Kant attribute falsity here, rather than saying there is nothing
at all? Also, if Kant had in mind a second notion of falsity, one would expect to ﬁnd
some evidence for it. But again, although there are passages (considered below)
where it looks like Kant takes contradictions to be `nothing', he doesn't in the same
place claim they are false. I think we can, thus, tentatively take Kant at face value
when he says that a contradiction is false. (Tentatively also because these passages
are from the logic lectures.)
In short, Kant does allow for genuine illogical thought. Key claims of his phi-
losophy implicitly commit him to this, as well as more explicit claims about con-
tradictions. Moreover, as we saw at the beginning, he explicitly states that logic
concerns what we ought to think. Nevertheless, none of this shows that he doesn't
make diﬀerent claims elsewhere, or that we shouldn't allow those other claims to
overrule the prima facie evidence that Kant's logical laws are normative. We must
also consider the primary textual evidence for the constitutive interpretation.
4 Is there contradictory thought? Arguments against.
Tolley marshalls examples of apparently clear cases of Kant claiming that contra-
dictory judgments are `nothing'. The ﬁrst example is from the Critique:
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[T]he general though to be sure only negative condition of all our judg-
ments whatsoever is that they do not contradict themselves; otherwise
these judgments in themselves (even without regard to the object) are
nothing. (A150/B189).
We should ﬁrst note that this statement concerns judgments and not thoughts more
generally. Earlier in the Critique, Kant states that `Judgment is ... the mediate
cognition of an object' (A68/B93). Judgments have to be objectively validthey
must succeed in saying something about the world.13 But thoughts in general do
not, as I noted above. The constraints on objective validity come from both general
and transcendental logic. So, for example, a(n objectively valid) judgment must be
in accordance with principles of the understanding, such as the principle of causation,
but it must also be in accordance with the principle of contradiction. Objectivity
of our judgments requires the real possibility of an object, and it is not possible
for there to be a contradictory object. (See, e.g., Bxxvi.) Hence, if a purported
judgment is contradictory, it cannot have an object, and so is not a judgment at
all. Hence it is nothing, as a judgment. But it still might be a thought.
Perhaps Kant already accounts for this in adding, `even without regard to the
object'. What does that caveat mean? There is a simple reading in line with my
interpretation. It simply says: even if we disregard the fact that such a judgment
wouldn't agree with its object, because no object is contradictory in nature, we
should go further. There is no judgment at all, because judgments are objectively
valid, and in this case, the judgment doesn't simply get the object wrong, it has no
object at all, because it fails to conform to constraints on objective validity. But
again, this says nothing about whether or not there can be a (not objectively valid)
thought.
Kant makes such a distinction between cognition and thought in the B-Preface.14
This supports my point to an extent, but also raises another threat.
16
To cognize an object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility
... But I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself,
i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought... (Bxxvi)
The ﬁrst kind of possibility (connected to cognizing) is real possibility, and the
second (possibility of thought) is logical. I will return to this point below.
Tolley takes a further example from Kant's `Polemic against Eberhard', his 1790
essay `On a discovery whereby any new critique of pure reason is to be made
superﬂuous by an older one'.
whatever conﬂicts with [the Principle of Contradiction] is obviously no-
thing (not even a thought). (8:195: Kant, 2002, 290)
This looks pretty damning. It is stronger than saying that a judgment is nothing;
there is not even a thought. However, on the previous page (194, in a footnote)
Kant writes
The Critique has noted the distinction between problematic and as-
sertoric judgments. An assertoric judgment is a proposition. ... The
judgment: some bodies are simple, may, indeed, be contradictory; it
can nevertheless still be aﬃrmed in order to see what follows from it, if
it were to be stated as an assertion, i.e., a proposition. (8:194: Kant,
2002, 289)
Here Kant allows that one can aﬃrm, that is, assertorically judge, something con-
tradictory. There is therefore a clear tension between what Kant has to say on these
two consecutive pages.
How should we resolve this tension? The claim that one can assertorically judge
a contradiction is clearly labelled as Kant's view from the Critique: `The Critique
has noted...'. By contrast, the claim that a contradiction is `not even a thought'
appears in a paragraph beginning,
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It is, however, not without mature consideration, and with a purpose
that [Eberhard] would gladly conceal from the reader, that he endea-
vours to demonstrate this transcendental principle [principle of suﬃcient
reason] on the basis of the principle of contradiction. (8:194: Kant,
2002, 290)
Kant's purpose here appears to be to describe a line of thought from Eberhard, not
from himself. Admittedly, by the time we get to the troublesome claim, the tone
seems to have shifted back to Kant's voice:
Now, it is clear that the principle of contradiction is a principle that is
valid for all that we can possibly think, whether or not it is a sensible
object with a possible intuition attached; because it is valid for thought
in general, without regard to any object. Thus, whatever conﬂicts with
this principle is obviously nothing (not even a thought). (8:195: Kant,
2002, 290).
Even so, I think the following is a plausible resolution to the tension. We should take
more seriously the remarks labelled as expressing the view of the Critique, privileging
the Critique as an (perhaps the most) important primary source. We can explain
away the ensuing remarks as overstated, or at least take them less seriously, given
that they are in the context of outlining and attacking Eberhard's view.
Both cases turn on the claim that a judgment or thought is `nothing'. Kant
has more to say about what `nothing' means. In the Critique, he gives an account
of four diﬀerent meanings of `nothing' (A292/B348). Of particular interest to us
is the `nothing' of contradiction, the nihil negativum. According to Kant, there
are diﬀerent reasons that might explain why an empty concept has no object: it
might be a consistent concept but fail to conform with the conditions of possible
experience (logically possible, really impossible), or it might be self-contradictory
(logically impossible).
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One sees that the thought-entity (No.1) is distinguished from the non-
entity (No.4) by the fact that the former may not be counted among the
possibilities because it is a mere invention (although not self-contradictory),
whereas the latter is opposed to possibility because even its concept can-
cels itself out. Both, however, are empty concepts. (A292/B348, my
emphasis.)
The nihil negativum (No.4) is the kind of `nothing' where nothing falls under a
concept because that concept is contradictory. This is not to say that the represen-
tation itself doesn't exist (there is no concept/thought), but rather to say that the
representation logically necessarily lacks an object.
Kant muddies the waters by entitling this kind of nothing in his table `Empty
object without concept' (A292/B348). This suggests that there is not a concept
that is contradictory, but rather no concept at all. This is at odds with his remark,
just cited, that it is an empty concept, that is, it is a concept, but an empty one.
In this instance, I think we should take the latter statement, that this is a case of
an empty concept, more seriously.
First, Kant contrasts these two cases (of an empty concept) with two further
cases where we lack suﬃcient data to have a concept at all, for example, where
we don't have the positive data from which to form a negative concept: `if light
were not given to the senses, then one would also not be able to represent darkness'
(A292/B349). This contrast suggests that the ﬁrst two cases are indeed concepts.
Second, it is plausible to think that we can possess and understand contradictory
concepts. For example, most philosophers at some time or other have acquired the
concept of a square circle. It is because we understand what it means, that we are
able to understand why there could be no such thing. Indeed, Kant discusses this
example in the Prolegomena:
Of two mutually contradictory propositions both cannot be false save
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when the concept underlying them both is itself contradictory; e.g., the
two propositions: a square circle is round, and: a square circle is not
round, are both false. ... The logical mark of the impossibility of a con-
cept consists, then, in this: that under the presupposition of this con-
cept, two contradictory propositions would be false simultaneously; and
since between these two no third proposition can be thought, through
this concept nothing at all is thought.' (4:341 Kant, 2004, 923)
Here again we ﬁnd a tension. On the one hand, one might take this to show that
Kant thought that there is no concept of a square circle, because it is `logically
impossible' and through it `nothing is thought'. On the other, Kant talks of the
concept underlying the mutually contradictory propositions, and how he can oﬀer
the contradictoriness of this concept as an explanation of how mutually contradic-
tory propositions could both be false. Now, one might argue that we could explain
the falsity of some proposition by appeal to the absence of a concept, hence we
could explain why, for example, it is false that a square circle is round by appeal
to its lack of a subject concept. However, in this case we also need to account for
the relevant pair of propositions being contradictory. If they both lacked a concept,
they would both simply be false. It is because they share the same contradictory
concept, square circle, that we can explain how they are in contradiction with one
another. Further, we have already seen how to understand `nothing is thought' as
stating that the concept cannot have an object. The logical impossibility of the
concept need not mean that it is logically impossible that such a concept exist, but
rather that it is logically impossible that such a concept have an object.
So, in saying that a concept is `nothing', in the sense of the nihil negativum, we
can understand Kant as saying that the concept is logically necessarily empty. If we
extend this to judgments and thoughts as well as concepts, then the passages above
simply claim that a self-contradictory judgment or thought will logically necessarily
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lack an object.15
We are also now in a position to respond to the worry raised by the B-Preface
passage, that `possible thoughts' cannot contradict themselves: ` I can think wha-
tever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a
possible thought' (Bxxvi). We can now see that there are two ways to understand
the logical impossibility of a representation: it might be logically impossible for it
to exist, or for it to have an object. Given all the evidence in favour of Kant's com-
mitment to the possible existence of contradictory thoughts, we should favour the
second reading: I can think what I like, but I shouldn't contradict myself, because
such thoughts are logically impossible, that is, they can't (logically) be true.
Next, then, in the Critique, Kant introduces general logic as containing `the
absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use of the understanding
takes place' (A52/B76). Tolley takes this to show that Kant took these rules to be
constitutive of thought.
Here the clear implication would seem to be that, with respect to the
laws of general logic, the understanding simply cannot actthat is, it is
not free to actwithout abiding by these absolutely necessary rules;
otherwise nothing at all would take place in thought. Tolley (2006,
384)
I agree that it is diﬃcult to square a purely normative reading with this. But a
reading according to which these rules of thinking are constitutive norms can easily
accommodate the statement. If there were no such rules, then there would be
no thought, because it is constitutive of thought to be evaluable in light of those
rules. So we might say instead: `with respect to the laws of general logic, the
understanding simply cannot think without being subject to, even if not always
abiding by, these absolutely necessary rules'. This is how MacFarlane recommends
we read the passage:
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By necessary laws of the understanding, Kant means . . . those [laws]
without which no use of the understanding would be possible at all . . . 
(JL:12), that is, the norms constitutive of thought. Similarly, in the
ﬁrst Critique he says that general logic . . . contains the absolutely
necessary rules of thought without which there can be no employment
whatsoever of the understanding (KrV:A52/B76). (MacFarlane, 2002,
53)
Note that Kant uses the phrase `absolutely necessary'. Stang (2016) draws out
what Kant means by this.
It is absolutely necessary that p if and only if ¬p cancels all possibility.
(Stang, 2016, 124)
With this in hand, we can see why Kant continues in the statement above that
`no use of the understanding takes place'. The idea is that general logical laws
are absolutely necessary rules for thinking, because their absence would cancel the
possibility of any thinking. It is constitutive of thinking that there must be some
rules for thinking, hence, if there were no such rules, there would be no possibility
of thinking. But that can be understood in two ways, either straightforwardly
constitutively (as per Tolley), or constitutive-normatively (as per MacFarlane). We
can say: if there were no rules for thinking, thinking would not be possible, because
there would be nothing evaluability in light of which would suﬃce for a mental
state to count as a thought. A proper understanding of `absolutely necessary' here
thus lends support to some kind of constitutive reading, but does not rule out the
constitutive norms reading.
Let us consider one further example. At the beginning of the Jäsche Logik, Kant
likens the laws of thought to laws of nature. Given that the latter are understood
as descriptive laws of how the natural world behaves, one might wonder whether
here Kant intends a descriptive rather than prescriptive, hence constitutive rather
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than normative, understanding of logical laws.16
Everything in nature, both in the lifeless and in the living world, takes
place according to rules, although we are not always acquainted with
these rules.  Water falls according to laws of gravity, and with animals
locomotion also takes place according to rules. The ﬁsh in the water,
the bird in the air, move according to rules. The whole of nature in
general is really nothing but a connection of appearances according to
rules ...
The exercise of our powers also takes place according to certain rules
that we follow ...
Like all our powers, the understanding in particular is bound in its
actions to rules, which we can investigate. (9:11 Kant, 1992, 527)
Perhaps a constitutive reading is supported by Kant's claim that the understanding
is `bound in its actions to rules' [bei seinen Handlungen an Regeln gebunden]. One
might think that the word `bound' [gebunden] strongly suggests that the understan-
ding cannot deviate from these rules. However, this is not at all clear. In German,
`ist an etwas gebunden' does not require a purely constitutive reading.17 To take
an English example: I might say, driving along, that I am bound by the rules of the
road to drive below 60 mph, but this doesn't imply that I cannot drive faster, just
that I shouldn't. Or by signing a contract, I bind myself to certain undertakings or
obligations, but that doesn't imply that I cannot break the contract, even though
doing so may have bad consequences. We can honour Kant's idea that thought is
rule-bound by taking the rules of thinking, laws of logic, to be normative in some
sense. The understanding is bound to rules, in the sense that it ought to follow
certain norms.
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5 Freedom and normativity
A large part of Tolley's constitutive interpretation is the contention that there is no
fruitful analogy to be drawn between Kant's account of practical or moral norma-
tivity, and logical laws. Hence, there is no way to understand the laws of logic as
being normative, according to Kant's account of normativity. In this section, I ﬁrst
argue that there are other conceptions of normativity in Kant's work; hence under-
standing logical normativity in terms of moral normativity isn't necessary. Second,
I'll gesture towards where we might ﬁnd speciﬁcally logical normativity in Kant's
work.
In brief, Tolley argues that moral laws are only normative, for Kant, insofar as
they relate to beings that are not purely rational. It is because we are partially
sensuous beings, where our rational will must overcome our sensible desires, that
moral laws have a normative status for us. We have a free choice to act morally or
not, and the moral law guides, although it does not fully determine, that free choice.
By contrast, Tolley argues, we do not have the same capacity for free choice when
it comes to thinking: whereas Kant includes an account of Willkür for practical
free choice, he includes no correlate capacity in his theoretical account.
Unlike in the moral dimensions of human activity (in which we ought to
exercise our free choice in accordance with the imperatives of practical
reason), there is no relevant capacity (or composite of capacities) in view
within formal logic for which formal-logical laws as such could then be
normative. (Tolley, 2006, 374)
I agree with Tolley that free will is not relevant to Kant's account of logic. Tolley
presents a range of convincing evidence, for example (from the Blomberg Logik):
Our author [Meyer] speaks in general in this whole section [21648]
of cognition, how it relates to free will. In logic, however, the relation
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of cognition to will is simply not considered; instead, this belongs to
morals. The relation of free will is not an objectum domesticum of
logic. (24:250 Kant, 1992, 200)
Tolley concludes that, for Kant, `Logic is simply not concerned with any speciﬁc
representations of what ought to move our free will, because it is not concerned
with the relationship between free will or volution and cognition at all' (Tolley,
2006, 381).
To make sense of any normative element to logical laws, we will need to appeal
to a notion of normativity that doesn't turn on free will, that is, it's not open to us
to understand deviation from the logical norm as involving some kind of freedom
to choose to think otherwise. Is there any evidence that Kant recognised a kind of
normativity that does not require free choice? And is there any evidence of Kant
having a peculiarly logical notion of normativity?
First, we can take evidence in favour of a normative (or constitutive normative)
interpretation of the laws of logicas oﬀered in this paperto lend support to
the view that Kant had a notion of logical normativity. If we add to this Tolley's
evidence that logical laws are not related to free will, then we could conclude that
Kant recognises a kind of normativity, logical normativity, that does not require
free choice. However, such an argument will hardly convince someone of Tolley's
persuasion, who doesn't accept the force of evidence for a normative interpretation.
The view that Kant had a notion of logical normativity would be further sup-
ported by Kant's using value terms in connection with logic: for example, `good',
`bad'.18 I noted above that Kant claims that contradictions are correctly denied
(A151/B1901). One might also appeal here to the colourfully negative language
with which Kant describes the predicament of reason. The threat of contradiction
from the Antinomies leads reason into the temptation of equally unpalatable alter-
natives, a `skeptical hopelessness' or `dogmatic stubbornness', which in turn would
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be `the death of a healthy philosophy' (A407/B433). Contradiction is not itself
described as diseased here, but it looms large over the prognosis of ill health. Kant
also claims that reason, ﬁnding itself `entangled in a crowd of arguments and coun-
terarguments', cannot simply walk away, but `on account of its honor ', must `reﬂect
on the origin of this disunity of reason with itself' (A464/B492, emphasis added).
What might a positive account of logical normativity look like? Rather than
thinking of normativity in terms of evaluating the action of a free choice, we can
think of normativity in terms of the existence of a standard against which things
count as good or bad, right or wrong (recall Sellars' distinction between oughts-to-do
and oughts-to-be). The laws of logic provide a standard against which thoughts are
evaluable. There need be no possibility of failure to accord with the law (although
for us there is): a perfectly rational being would still be right. And there need
be no capacity for genuinely free choice: thought can still be evaluated against
the standard of logic, regardless of how we came to have one thought rather than
another.
There is some evidence that Kant recognised norms of this latter kind. In the
following, he explicitly glosses `norm' as a standard against which to pass judgment
on something.
By virtue of the fact that logic is to be taken as a science a priori,
or as a doctrine for a canon of the use of the understanding and of
reason, it is essentially distinct from aesthetics, which as mere critique
of taste has no canon (law) but only a norm (model or standard for
passing judgment), which consists in universal agreement. Aesthetics,
that is, contains the rules for the agreement of cognition with the laws of
sensibility; logic, on the other hand, contains the rules for the agreement
of cognition with the laws of the understanding and of reason. (9:15
Kant, 1992, 530)
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Both logic and aesthetics contain rules for cognition. In aesthetics, that rule is
(only) a norm, in the sense that it provides a standard for passing judgment. The
rules of logic are laws because they are based on a priori principles, rather than
empirical principles.
As a canon of the understanding and of reason it may not borrow any
principles either from any science or from any experience; it must con-
tain nothing but laws a priori, which are necessary and have to do with
the understanding in general. (9:13-14 Kant, 1992, 529)
Further, we can also pass judgment on a cognition given a logical standard, given
relevant a priori norms.
The logical perfection of cognition rests on its agreement with the ob-
ject, hence on universally valid laws, and hence we can pass judgment
on it according to norms a priori. (9:36 Kant, 1992, 547)
These passages hint towards the view that the laws of logic provide a priori norms
for cognition. But so far this is only a hint. (Not least, because these passages are
taken from the lectures on logic.) I leave further work on a positive development of
Kant's notion of logical normativity for elsewhere.
6 Conclusion
According to received wisdom, Kant takes the laws of logic to be normative laws of
thought. This has been challenged by Tolley (2006). In this paper, I have sought
to defend the received wisdom, but with an important modiﬁcation. There are
features of Kant's philosophy that we can only accommodate if the laws of logic
are normative in some sense, but equally, some passages are hard to square with
this reading. If we take the laws of logic to be constitutive norms for thought,
then we can make sense of both sets of seemingly conﬂicting considerations. The
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laws of logic do tell us what thinking is, not because all thoughts are in conformity
with logical laws, but because all thoughts are, by nature, subject to the standard
of logic. Finally, if it is correct that Kant's laws of logic are normative in some
sense, but not in a sense that would involve something akin to practical free choice,
then we must also conclude that there is more to normativity for Kant than moral
normativity.19
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Notes
1See also MacFarlane (2002, 37) on chess. One might disagree with game examples. Perhaps
the reason the game has to be reversed (go back a move) or stopped (the whistle is blown) is
because the action didn't count as playing the game at all. I shall not attempt to settle the issue
here. My aim is to argue for the constitutive normativity of logical laws, not of the rules of games.
These game examples are oﬀered as a (potentially) intuitive introduction to constitutive norms,
not as additional evidence that there are such things as constitutive norms. Thank you to an
anonymous referee for pressing this point.
2See Leech (2015); MacFarlane (2002); Steinberger (forthcoming); Taschek (2008) for discus-
sion. MacFarlane's paper in particular compares the diﬀerent ways in which Kant and Frege come
to agree on this.
3Tolley (2006) lists: Hanna (2006a,b); Lanier Anderson (2005); MacFarlane (2002); Tiles
(2004).
4Thank you to an anonymous referee for suggesting this as a helpful distinction in the present
context.
5See Bird (2006) and Vanzo (2012). I discuss Kant's distinction between thought and cognition
at length in AUTHOR2.
6I have avoided using the word `judgment' here, to avoid confusion. For Kant, judgments
do not have the equivalent of assertoric force, in contrast to common contemporary usage. See
(A745/B99-100).
7A two-aspect interpretation of transcendental idealism maintains that appearances and things
in themselves are not distinct kinds of object, but distinct aspects of the same objects. See Allais
28
(2004) for an instructive overview of the diﬀerent interpretations, and a defence of the two-aspect
interpretation.
8A and B are contradictories if and only if they can't both be true and they can't both be false.
A and B are contraries if and only if they can't both be true but they can both be false.
9Thank you to an anonymous referee for raising this possibility.
10Tolley considers something akin to this strategy on p.391.
11Thank you to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
12See Tolley (2006, 385).
13I am here ignoring questions over whether merely subjectively valid judgments are, for Kant,
really judgments. If they are, then in what follows read a silent objectively valid before each
judgment. For more on this issue, see Beck (1998); Longuenesse (1998); Sassen (2008).
14What is the relation between judgment and cognition for Kant? This is another thorny question
to which I cannot do justice here. It suﬃces to say for present purposes, that both cognitions
and judgments must be objectively valid, whereas thoughts may fail to be. My interest in the
distinction Kant makes between thought and cognition here is primarily to show that thoughts can
fail to be objectively valid, and hence that, as judgments cannot, it is signiﬁcant when Kant is
writing about judgments.
15I see no obvious problem with this extension. If one judges that p and not-p, one can have
the concept of things being such that p and not-p.
16Thank you to Alberto Vanzo for drawing my attention to this passage.
17Thank you to Mark Textor (a native German speaker) for conﬁrming this.
18Thank you to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
19Thank you to John Callanan and Sacha Golob for helpful discussions on a version of the paper,
to two anonymous referees for this journal for helpful comments, and to Joe Saunders and Bob
Stern for a fruitful discussion of Tolley's paper several years ago, which eventually led to some of
the work in this paper.
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